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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS)

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

Civil No. 840735759
Appellate No. 960548-CA

:
Priority No. 15

BRUCE C. EDWARDS,

:

Defendant/Appe11ant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
all final judgments and orders of the District Court
involving domestic relations cases pursuant to 78-2a-3,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) and Rule 3 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED CORRECT PROCEDURES WITH
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION.
Standard of Appellate Review:
Mixed issues of fact and law and the standard of
review to be applied was thoroughly discussed in State v.

1

Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

In Pena, the Court said

that at the most basic level, there were two different
types of questions presented to a trial Court, questions
of law and questions of fact.
Factual questions are generally
regarded as entailing the empirical,
such as things, events, actions, or
conditions happening, existing or
taking place, as well as the
subjective, such as state of mind.
Legal determinations, on the other
hand, are defined as those which are
not of fact but are essentially of
rules or principles uniformly applied
to persons or similar qualities and
status in similar circumstances.
At 935.
Findings of Fact are to be reviewed by an appellate
Court under the clearly erroneous standard.

For the

appellate Court to find clear error, "it must decide that
the factual findings made by the trial Court are not
adequately

supported

by

the

record,

resolving

all

disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial Court's determination".
Determinations

of

At 936.

law are to be

reviewed

for

correctness. That means "the appellate Court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the
trial judge's determination of law".
In Pena, the Court went on to discuss a third
2

category of determinations. That is whether a given set
of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.
The Court concluded

that there are some fact-legal

questions which could result in a "some discretion"
standard of review.
The procedures followed by the Judge against whom an
Affidavit for Disqualification is directed should be
reviewed for correctness. The decision of the reviewing
judge is a mixture of law and fact and should fall under
the "some discretion" standard of review.
Some of the points raised by defendant under this
issue have not been adequately referenced in the record.
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that issues raised on appeal must adequately cite the
record or the issue will be summarily rejected.

Koulis

v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182f 1184-1185
(Utah App. 1987).
2.

THE COURT'S COMMENT CONCERNING

PROSPECTIVE

CONTEMPTUOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER SUBJECT TO
APPELLATE REVIEW.
Standard of Appellate Review:
Only final orders are subject to appellate review.
The Court's comments to the defendant concerning his
3

failure to make future child support payments did not
constitute a final order. Accordingly, no appeal should
be permitted on this issue.
STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal of the final judgment entered
July 23, 1996 in the Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

This is a divorce case with a long history of postdivorce actions, many of which were the result of
defendant's failure to pay child support as ordered.
Those proceedings are detailed in the Statement of Facts.
At a hearing on July 3, 1996, the Court considered the
defendant's failure to pay child support as previously
ordered, plaintiff's Petition to increase support and
defendant's Affidavit

to address problems

regarding

visitation.
Prior to this hearing, defendant had been found in
contempt for failing to comply with a prior order and was
sentenced to three days in jail.
Following the contempt finding, but prior to this
hearing, defendant filed an Affidavit of Disqualification
4

claiming bias or prejudice on the part of Judge
Rodney Page.

Judge Page referred the matter to Judge

Memmott pursuant to Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Judge Memmott ruled that the Affidavit was

legally insufficient and returned the matter to Judge
Page for hearing.
III.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.

At the July 3, 1996 hearing, the Court ordered the
defendant to make child support payments through the
clerk of the court by the 5th day of each month and if
the support was not deposited with the clerk by the 10th,
a

bench

warrant

would

issue.

The

Court

denied

plaintiffs request to increase support.
The Court also found the defendant in contempt once
again

for

failure

to

pay

child

support

on

time.

Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail which was
stayed, contingent

upon the defendant's

payment of

support as ordered. The Court also said that every month
the defendant failed to make support would constitute a
separate contempt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has a long history.

The background and

proceedings up to the July 3, 1996 hearing are relevant
5

in understanding the Judge's order and comments, as well
as the decision regarding disqualification.
The plaintiff initiated this divorce in June of
1984. (R 1)

There was a brief effort at reconciliation

which failed and an Amended Complaint was filed in March,
1985. (R 21)
At

an initial

hearing

held May

16, 1985, the

plaintiff was awarded the temporary custody of the minor
child

subject

defendant

to defendant's

was ordered

visitation

to pay

rights

and

$105.00 per month as

temporary child support. (R 36-38)
Trial was held November 4, 1985 which included
issues of custody and future support.
awarded

custody.

Defendant

was

Plaintiff was

delinquent

in the

temporary child support order and a judgment was entered.
Defendant was ordered to continue child support at the
rate of $105.00 per month, but the defendant was further
ordered to provide income information to the Court and
the matter was continued to February 6, 1986 for further
re-examination of the amount of child support to be paid.
(R 48-54)
At

the

February

6,

1986

hearing,

no

further

modifications were made to the amount of support, but
6

either party was given the right to refer the matter back
to court at any time relative to the issue of support.
(R 63)
In March, 1987, the plaintiff filed her first postdivorce Affidavit for Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt
alleging, among other things, the defendants delinquency
in child support. (R 65-69)
At a hearing before the Commissioner on
April 2, 1987, it was determined defendant was delinquent
in his child support in the sum of $1,050.00 and a
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. (R78)
At a subsequent hearing on July 16, 1987, it was
determined the defendant had paid the plaintiff some
support, but was still delinquent.

The Commissioner

recommended a finding of contempt. (R 90)
Another hearing was held before the Commissioner on
November

12,

1987

regarding visitation.

pursuant

to

defendant's

claims

At that hearing, defendant was

once again admonished to get his support current and if
not current the next time he appeared in court, his
matters would be dismissed. (R 98)
Numerous pleadings were filed with the Court over
the next five years, but no hearing occurred until
7

June 24, 1992.
Petition

for

This was a pre-trial on plaintiff's
modification

which

also

alleged

the

defendant's failure to pay child support for a period of
thirteen months. (R 127-132) The pre-trial was continued
to

permit

defendant

time

to

file

an

Answer

and

Counterclaim regarding the issues of child support.
(R 140)
The continued pre-trial was not heard until
January

13,

1993,

at

which

time

the

Commissioner

recommended the parties settle on a $2/500.00 compromised
amount for delinquent child support. (R 165)
Further pre-trial proceedings occurred on
December 7, 1993 pursuant to plaintiff's Petition for
modification

and

modification.
position

and

recommendations

defendant's

Counter-Petition

for

The parties proffered their respective
the

Commissioner

thereafter

which the parties accepted with

made
some

additional compromises. Based upon these compromises and
agreements, the Court entered orders including:
1. Defendant's child support was to be increased to
$175.00 per month effective December, 1993.
2.

Delinquent child support was set at $4,000.00

and defendant was to pay the delinquency within ten days
8

of the date of the hearing or no later than
December 17, 1993.
3.

Judgment was entered against the defendant in

the sum of $1,119.12 representing other debts he was
ordered to pay in the Decree of divorce. He was ordered
to pay that judgment at the rate of $100.00 per month
effective January, 1994.
4.

Detailed visitation rights for the defendant

which settled all prior disputes concerning visitation.
That stipulated Order was signed by defendant's
counsel "approved as to form" and signed by the Court as
an order on December 20, 1993. (R 191-196)
On January 10, 1994, plaintiff filed a Motion to set
aside that stipulation because defendant had failed to
pay the $4,000.00 delinquent child support he was ordered
to pay by December 17, 1993. (R 197-199)
Plaintiff's Motion was heard on January 26, 1994.
At that hearing, the Commissioner signed an amended
stipulated Order (modest language changes were made) and
defendant agreed he would pay $4,100.00 to the plaintiff
within ten days ($4,000.00 on delinquent child support
judgment

and

$100.00 on the other

judgment).

The

Commissioner also indicated that if the defendant failed
9

to pay the sum as agreed, plaintiff's counsel's affidavit
would be sufficient grounds to set aside the stipulated
order and refer the matter to trial. (R 207)
The defendant paid the $4,000.00 delinquent child
support

judgment

and

a Satisfaction

of

Judgment

was

entered on February 9, 1994. (R 208)
Two days after the January 26, 1994 hearing, the
defendant signed a pro se Petition for modification of
the Decree of divorce, claiming problems with visitation.
Every issue raised in his Petition had been addressed by
the Court in earlier hearings and settled by the
January 26, 1994 Order. (R 210-219)
Plaintiff

filed a Motion to dismiss

defendant's

Petition and requested attorney fees and other sanctions,
contending
purpose

the Petition had been

than

to

harass

her

and

filed
cause

for no other
her

to

incur

additional attorney fees. (R 225-227)
There was a hearing before the Commissioner on
April

12,

1994.

The

Court

refused

to

modify

the

previously ordered visitation, but did recommend that the
parties engage in counseling and encouraged them to reach
an agreement concerning transportation relative to the
plaintiff having moved forty-two miles from the defendant
10

following the last hearing. The Court said it would make
a ruling on plaintiff's Motion to dismiss if the parties
could not reach an agreement and the matter was continued
without date. (R 231)
By letter to the Commissioner dated June 13, 1994,
the Commissioner was informed by plaintiff's counsel that
defendant had failed to consider any agreement and asked
the Court to issue a decision relative to plaintiff's
Motion to dismiss and Request for sanctions. (R 233)
The next hearing was on September 28, 1994. At that
time, the Commissioner dismissed defendant's Petition for
modification on the basis there had been no substantial
change of circumstances and awarded plaintiff a judgment
for attorney fees. The Court was informed that defendant
had once again become delinquent in his child support and
it was plaintiff's intent to file an Order to Show Cause
in re contempt. Accordingly, the Commissioner said that
if the defendant filed objections to the recommendations
dismissing his Petition thereby transferring the matter
to District Court, the plaintiff could file her Order to
Show Cause directly with the District Court without first
having the matter heard by the Commissioner. (R 241-242)
On

October

19, 1994, the
11

plaintiff

filed

her

Affidavit

for

Order

to

Show

Cause

in

re

contempt

allegingf among other things, that the defendant was five
months delinquent in his child support and had only made
one $100.00 payment on the judgment he was ordered to pay
at the rate of $100.00 per month beginning January, 1994.
(R 243-245)
The

defendant

did

not

file

Commissioner's recommendations.

objections

to the

Instead, he filed a

brand new Petition for modification.

This time, the

defendant added a new wrinkle and requested custody.
(R 247-249)

This maneuver kept all of the proceedings,

including plaintiff's contempt

Order to Show Cause,

before the Commissioner.
Defendant's

new

Petition

for

modification

and

plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re contempt were heard
by the Commissioner on June 19, 1995.

As part of that

hearing, the Commissioner interviewed the minor child in
chambers.

He then entered findings that there was no

reason to consider defendant's Petition for modification.
He found the defendant was once again in contempt in
failing to pay child support, as well as the amount he
was ordered to pay on the prior judgment. Findings were
also made indicating defendant should be required to pay
12

some of plaintiff's attorney fees for having been drawn
into

the

defendant's

unnecessarily.

modification

Recommendations

proceedings

consistent with those

findings were made and the matter was scheduled for trial
before Judge Page. (R 273-274)
At a hearing on November 6, 1995, Judge Page found
the defendant was well aware of the order requiring him
to pay $175.00 per month as child support, as well as the
order requiring him to pay $100.00 per month on the
additional judgment for marital debts.

The Court found

the defendant had missed five months child support prior
to

this

hearing

and

his

failure

was

wilful

and

contemptuous, but that he had purged this contempt by
paying the delinquent child support just prior to the
start of the hearing. The Court also found the defendant
had only paid one $100.00 payment on the judgment he was
ordered to pay at $100.00 per month and that his failure
to pay the $100.00 per month was wilful and contemptuous.
Based on that finding of contempt, the Court sentenced
the defendant to jail for three days.

The defendant was

ordered to pay the balance of the judgment
within ten days.

($1,019.12)

The issue of custody was reserved

subject to the completion of a child custody evaluation.
13

Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. (R 294-300)
The next hearing was held January 24, 1996.
custody

evaluation

had

been

completed

and

The
the

recommendation of the evaluator was that custody would
remain with the plaintiff.
withdrew

his

Petition

Accordingly, the defendant

for

modification

requesting

custody. It was determined that the defendant had failed
to comply with the Court's earlier order to pay the
$1,019.12 judgment within ten days, but that it was paid
just a few days prior to the hearing.

Plaintiff's

request for additional attorney fees was taken under
advisement. (R 308-310)
Supplemental findings were issued March 11, 1996f
granting

plaintiff

judgment

against

defendant

for

additional attorney fees. (R 324-326)
By May, 1996, the defendant had once again become
delinquent in his child support and plaintiff was forced
to file a new Order to Show Cause in re contempt.
(R 327-334) . She also requested some modification on the
visitation rights because of problems between the minor
child and the defendant.
The contempt and modification matter was scheduled
for hearing for July 3, 1996. (R 340)
14

On June 10, 1996, defendant filed his Affidavit of
Disqualification claiming bias or prejudice on the part
of Judge Page. (R 351-358)
Although not legally required to do so, plaintiff
filed

a

response

to

defendant's

Affidavit

of

Disqualification. (R 365-370)
Judge Page filed a response to the Affidavit denying
any bias and certified the matter to Judge Memmott, the
presiding judge, for determination. (R 379-380)
Judge

Memmott

concluded

that

the Affidavit

was

legally insufficient and remanded the matter to Judge
Page for further disposition and hearing. (R373-377)
The hearing which is the subject matter of this
appeal

was

held

July

3,

1996.

At

this

hearing,

plaintiff's testimony was submitted by proffer of counsel
which

included

representations

that

when

plaintiff

initiated her Order to Show Cause in re contempt for
delinquent

support,

the

defendant

was

two

months

delinquent but brought those months current shortly after
having been served the Order.

June's child support was

delivered to plaintiff's counsel's office the day before
the July 3, 1996 hearing. (R 398-399)
visited with the minor child
15

The judge also

in chambers

to discuss

problems with visitation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant has failed to reference the record of
this case supporting any of his claims of actual bias on
the

part

of

defendant's

Judge

Page.

Affidavit

of

sufficiency.
to

do

and

Memmott

Disqualification

reviewed
for

legal

He reviewed the record as he was permitted

concluded

insufficient.

Judge

that

the Affidavit was

legally

His conclusion was not error.

When the Court told the defendant that failure to
make child support payments on time would constitute a
separate contempt, it did not constitute a final order
and therefore is not a valid issue on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED CORRECT
PROCEDURES WITH DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT
OF DISQUALIFICATION.
The defendant advances two theories in his claim
that the trial Court should have disqualified itself for
bias and prejudice.

The first theory is premised upon

the claim that the trial Court displayed actual bias and
prejudice against the defendant and presumably should
have recused himself without ever referring the matter to
16

another judge for ruling on the legal sufficiency of the
Affidavit seeking disqualification.

Defendant's Brief

summarizes six allegations made by him in his Affidavit
seeking disqualification which he claims are supportive
of his contention that actual bias existed on the part of
Judge Page.
(1)

They are:

"The Court had precluded defendant's counsel

from arguing a valid legal point."
Defendant's Brief is void of any references to the
record

or

Plaintiff

transcript
acknowledges

supporting
that

at

this

an

allegation.

earlier

hearing,

defendant's counsel was advised by the judge to refrain
from pursuing a line of argument.

The nature of that

argument and the judge's comments are not contained in
this record, nor has defendant supported his allegations
by citations to the record in accordance with Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
be summarily rejected.

The claim should

Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of

Cal., 746 P.2d 1182, 11984-1185 (Utah App. 1987).
(2)

"The

Court

had

previously

sentenced

the

defendant to jail for contempt in the same matter."
Once again, the defendant has failed to make any
reference to the record in support of this allegation.
17

The plaintiff acknowledges that defendant had previously
been sentenced to three days in jail for his contempt.
This was because of the defendant's failure to comply
with a lawful order, an order to which he had previously
stipulated. (R 294-300)
The mere fact that the defendant has previously been
found in contempt for violating a court's order does not
automatically thereafter disqualify the trial judge from
ever hearing a matter involving the same defendant.

In

domestic matters it is not uncommon for a trial judge to
be assigned to the same case throughout its history and
to consider allegations and issues of contempt on a
repeated basis.
(3)

"The Court was openly critical of defendant's

parenting style."
The only record reference in defendant's Brief on
this issue relates to a comment made by Judge Page at the
hearing after defendant had filed his Affidavit seeking
disqualification.

There is no record reference to any

comments by Judge Page preceding the time defendant filed
his Affidavit.
The comment referenced in defendant's Brief was made
following the Judge's interview of the minor child in
18

chambers (R 449-455) and evidence at the hearing that
when the defendant questioned the minor child concerning
visitation with his mother and didn't like his answer, he
required

him to do ten push-ups while traveling the

highway between Ogden and Coalville (R433) and then had
him do another ten push-ups following the first ten (R
433).

Defendant said he had his son do these push-ups

"because he was being stubborn and arrogant and because
his definition was inconsistent with Webster's definition
of the word negotiation, I made him do ten push-ups". (R
434)
(4)

"The

Court

invited

further

ex

parte

communication with defendant's son".
Once again, the defendant has failed to make any
reference to the record in support of this allegation.
(5) "The Court circumvented its customary and usual
practices".
Defendant fails to articulate any facts or evidence
supporting this allegation, nor are there any references
to

the

record

suggesting

that

customary

and

usual

practices were circumvented.
(6)

"The Court made findings of fact contrary to

the parties' stipulation".
19

Here again, the defendant fails to articulate any
facts or evidence supporting this allegation, nor are
there any references to the record

suggesting that

findings of fact were made contrary to the parties'
stipulation.
Defendant's second theory in support of his claim
that the trial Court erred in failing to disqualify
itself is premised upon the claim that Judge Memmott
improperly

reviewed

defendant's Affidavit

for legal

sufficiency. In this regard, defendant relies upon Young
v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1996).
Defendant claims that Judge Memmott weighed evidence
and did not limit its review to the legal sufficiency of
defendant's

Affidavit.

Judge

Memmott's

Ruling

on

defendant's motion for disqualification is appended to
defendant's Brief.

It is obvious that Judge Memmott

understood the scope and limitation of his review.
In

analyzing

the

defendant's

Affidavit,

Judge

Memmott did nothing more than review the record to see if
it supported defendant's allegations.

A review of

pertinent parts of the record is appropriate under the
holding of Young, supra.
Given the history of this case which has been
20

recited

in

detail

in

this

Brieff

Judge

conclusion was accurate wherein he said:

Memmott's

"In reviewing

the totality of defendant's Affidavit, it appears to this
C|0urt that the defendant appears dissatisfied with the
prior rulings of Judge Page and is using this motion to
disqualify

him

from

the

case

because

of

his

dissatisfaction with prior rulings rather than on the
basis of bias and prejudice". (R 377)
POINT II
THE COURT'S COMMENT CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE
CONTEMPTUOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER
SUBJECT TO APPELLATE REVIEW.
At the conclusion of the July 3, 1996 hearing, the
Cburt said:
Child support from here on will remain
at the same level. The Court's feeling
is that the plaintiff has failed to
meet its burden to show a change of
circumstances. That doesn't mean that
that can't be brought back to the
Court's attention if, in fact, evidence
is obtainable to that extent.
Those payments are to be made through
the clerk of the court by the 5th day
of each month. If they have not been
deposited in the — with the court
clerk by the 10th of each month, a
bench warrant will issue.
Mr. Edwards you understand what that is?
Mr. Edwards: Yes sir.

21

Court finds that you're in contempt of
court for failure to pay child support
on time and for failure to pay each
month as previously ordered by the
Court. The Court will sentence you to
thirty days in the Davis County Jail.
I will stay the imposition of that
sentence, contingent upon your payment
of the support as previously ordered.
Every month you fail to make the payment
on time will be a separate contempt.
So you have one thirty-day commitment
right now. If there are any future,
any of those contempts will be added
on to that thirty-day period.
The Court will find that you were in
arrears when this Affidavit was filed
and you should be required to pay a
reasonable attorneys fee. I'll order
that you pay $250.00 to your ex-wife
for the benefit of her attorney.
The Court will order that that be
added to the prior judgment and that
you be ordered to pay $50.00 per
month towards that judgment and that's
to be paid along with your attorney
fees — or excuse me, the support,
through the clerk of the court. And
that will begin with the month of
July, so you have until the 10th of
July to make those payments.
(R 459-461)
Defendant claims that this is a prospective finding
of contempt. Plaintiff suggests that it is nothing more
than the Court's comments upon the defendant's obligation
to pay child support timely and the process that will
follow

in

the

event

defendant

22

fails

to

pay.

Pursuant to 30-3-10.6(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated,
each payment of child support under any child support
order is, on and after the date it is due, a judgment
with the same attributes and affect of any judgment of a
district court.

Pursuant to 78-32-1(5), Utah Code

Annotated, disobedience of any lawful judgment is a
contempt of court.
Judge

Page

did

nothing

more

than

defendant as to the status of the law.

inform

the

He did not

preclude the defendant from any entitlement to a hearing,
nor did Judge Page make any orders which were final and
therefore appealable.

This issue is without merit or

substance.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
The plaintiff seeks her attorney fees incurred on
this appeal.

She was awarded fees in the proceeding

below and ordinarily when fees are awarded

in the

litigation below to the party who then prevails on
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on
appeal.

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.

1990.
CONCLUSION
By

initiating

this
23

appeal,

defendant

has

demonstrated nothing more than his propensity to refuse
to accept lawful court orders, pursue litigation when
orders are not to his liking and raise invalid and
nonmeritorious claims. The appeal should be dismissed.
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees.
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January, 1997.
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